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Abstract
Today’s software systems communicate over the Internet using standard protocols that have been heavily scrutinized,
providing some assurance of resistance to malicious attacks and general robustness. However, the software that implements
those protocols may still contain mistakes, and an incorrect implementation could lead to vulnerabilities even in the most
well-understood protocol. The goal of this work is to close this gap by introducing a new technique for checking that a
C implementation of a protocol matches its description in an RFC or similar standards document. We present a static
(compile-time) source code analysis tool called Pistachio that checks C code against a rule-based speciﬁcation of its behav-
ior. Rules describe what should happen during each round of communication, and can be used to enforce constraints on
ordering of operations and on data values. Our analysis is not guaranteed sound due to some heuristic approximations it
makes, but has a low false negative rate in practice when compared to known bug reports. We have applied Pistachio to
two different implementations of SSH2 and an implementation of RCP. Pistachio discovered a multitude of bugs, including
security vulnerabilities, that we conﬁrmed by hand and checked against each project’s bug databases.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Networked software systems communicate using protocols designed to provide security against attacks and
robustness against network glitches. There has been a signiﬁcant body of research, both formal and informal, in
scrutinizing abstract protocols and proving that they meet certain reliability and safety requirements [1–5] (to
name only a few). These abstract protocols, however, are ultimately implemented in software, and an incorrect
implementation could lead to vulnerabilities even in the most heavily-studied and well-understood protocol.
In this paper we present a tool called Pistachio that helps close this gap. Pistachio is a static (compile-time)
analysis tool that checks that each communication step taken by a protocol implementationmatches an abstract
speciﬁcation. Because it starts from a detailed protocol speciﬁcation, Pistachio is able to check communication
properties that generic tools such as buffer overﬂow detectors do not look for. Our static analysis algorithm is
also very fast, enabling Pistachio to be deployed regularly during the development cycle, potentially on every
compile.
The input to our system is the C source code implementing the protocol and a rule-based speciﬁcation of its
behavior, where each rule typically describes what should happen in a “round” of communication. For example,
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the IETF current draft of the SSH connection protocol [6] speciﬁes that “When either party wishes to terminate
the channel, it sends SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE. Upon receiving this message, a party must send back a
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE . . ..”






This rule means that after seeing a call to recv() whose second argument points to memory containing
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, we should reply with the same type of message. The full version of such a
rule would also require that the reply contain the same channel identiﬁer as the initial message.
In addition to this speciﬁcation language, another key contribution of Pistachio is a novel static analysis algo-
rithm for checking protocol implementations against their rule-based speciﬁcation. Pistachio performs symbolic
execution, based on abstract interpretation [7], to simulate the execution of program source code, keeping track
of the state of program variables and of ghost variables representing abstract protocol state, such as the last
value received in a communication. Using a fully automatic theorem prover, Pistachio checks that whenever it
encounters a statement that triggers a rule (e.g., a call to recv), on all paths the conclusion of the rule is even-
tually satisﬁed (e.g., send is called with the right arguments). Although this seems potentially expensive, our
algorithms run efﬁciently in practice because the code corresponding to a round of communication is relatively
compact. Our static analysis is not guaranteed to ﬁnd all rule violations, both because it operates on C, an unsafe
language, and because the algorithm uses some heuristics to improve performance. In practice, however, our
system missed only about 5% of known bugs when measured against a bug database.
We applied Pistachio to three benchmarks: the LSH and OpenSSH implementations of SSH2 and the RCP
implementation from Cygwin. Our SSH2 speciﬁcation was originally developed with only LSH in mind, and
we found that only two out of 96 rules needed to be adjusted to accurately cover both LSH and OpenSSH,
suggesting that our approach is easily portable. Analysis took less than a minute for all of the test runs, and
Pistachio detected a multitude of bugs in the implementations, including many security vulnerabilities. For
example, Pistachio found a known problem in LSH that causes it to leak privileged information [8]. Pistachio
also found a number of buffer overﬂows due to rule violations, although Pistachio does not detect arbitrary
buffer overﬂows. We conﬁrmed the bugs we found against bug databases for the projects, and we also found
two new, unconﬁrmed security bugs in LSH: a buffer overﬂow and an incorrect authentication failure message
when using public key authentication.
We categorized the rules in our speciﬁcations according to their use, and found that all of the rule catego-
ries contribute signiﬁcantly to Pistachio’s warnings—or, put another way, programmers make mistakes in all
aspects of protocols. We also categorized the underlying code defects using a subset of Beizer’s bug taxonomy
[9]. We found that there were relatively few defects related to misuse of interfaces, perhaps because the network
protocol implementations are spread across few modules, but that otherwise defects range over the usual space
of mistakes.
Based on our results, we believe that Pistachio can be a valuable tool in ensuring the safety and security of
network protocol implementations. In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
– We present a rule-based speciﬁcation language for describing network protocol implementations. Using
pattern matching to identify routines in the source code and ghost variables to track state, we can naturally
represent the kinds of English speciﬁcations made in documents like RFCs (Section 2).
– We describe a static analysis algorithm for checking that an implementation meets a protocol speciﬁca-
tion. Our approach uses symbolic execution to simulate the program and an automatic theorem prover to
determine whether the rules are satisﬁed (Section 3).
– We have applied our implementation, Pistachio, to LSH, OpenSSH, and RCP. Pistachio discovered a wide
variety of known bugs, including security vulnerabilities, as well as two new, unconﬁrmed bugs. Overall
Pistachio missed about 5% of known bugs and had a 38% false positive rate (Section 4).
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Fig. 1. Simple alternating bit protocol implementation.
An earlier version of this work appeared in the Usenix Security conference [10]. There are several new con-
tributions of this version of the paper. First, we extended our experimental evaluation and ran Pistachio on
OpenSSH, whereas the original paper only used LSH and RCP. This allowed us to evaluate the portability of
rule speciﬁcations from one version to another, as well as to compare the warning and bug distributions for
the two versions of the same protocol. Second, our experimental results now uses a bug classiﬁcation system,
derived from Beizer [9], which allows us to categorize defects in a more systematic way and compare defects
in protocol implementations to defects in general software. Third, we describe a fact substitution process that
occurs during rule checking, which was omitted from the conference version, and adjusted our rule checking
algorithms slightly to show rule ﬁring more clearly. Fourth, we include a brief discussion of rule speciﬁcation
for library functions. Lastly, we added two new appendices, describing the language grammar and our choice
of theorem prover. We also made numerous small improvements throughout the paper.
2. Rule-based protocol speciﬁcation
The ﬁrst step in using Pistachio is developing a rule-based protocol speciﬁcation, usually from a standards
document. As an example, we develop a speciﬁcation for a straightforward extension of the alternating bit
protocol [11]. Here is a straw-man description of the protocol:
The protocol begins by sending the value n = 1. In each round, if n is received then send n+ 1; otherwise
resend n.
Fig. 1 gives a sample C implementation of this protocol. Here recv() and send() are used to receive and send
data, respectively. Notice that this implementation is actually ﬂawed—in statement 6, val is incremented by 2
instead of by 1.
To check this protocol, we must ﬁrst identify the communication primitives in the source code. In this case
we see that the calls to send() in statements 2 and 7 and the call to recv() in statement 4 perform the
communication. More speciﬁcally, we observe that we will need to track the value of the second argument in
the calls, since that contains a pointer to the value that is communicated.
We use patterns to match these function calls or other expressions in the source code. Patterns contain
pattern variables that specify which part of the call is of interest to the rule. For this protocol, we use pattern
send(_, out, _) tobindpatternvariableout to the secondargumentofsend(), andweusepatternrecv(_,
in, _) to bind in to the second argument of recv(). For other implementations we may need to use patterns
that match different functions. Notice that in both of these patterns, we are already abstracting away some
implementation details. For example, we do not check that the last parameter matches the size of val, or that
the communication socket is correct, i.e., these patterns will match calls even on other sockets.
Patterns can be used to match any function calls. For example, we have found that protocol implementers
often create higher-level functions that wrap send and receive operations, rather than calling low-level primi-
tives directly. Using patterns to match these functions can make for more compact rules that are faster to check,
though this is only safe if those routines are trusted.
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Fig. 2. Rule-based protocol speciﬁcation.
2.1. Rule encoding
Once we have identiﬁed the communication operations in the source code, we need to write rules that encode
the steps of the protocol. Rules are of the form
(PH ,H) ⇒ (PC ,C ,G)
where H is a hypothesis and C is a conclusion, PH and PC are patterns, and G is a set of assignments to ghost
variables representing protocol state. In words, such a rule means: If we ﬁnd a statement s in the program that
matches pattern PH , and the facts in H do not contradict the current state, then assume that H holds, and
make sure that on all possible execution paths from s there is some statement matching PC , and moreover at
that point the conditions in C must hold. If a rule is satisﬁed in this manner, then the side effects G to ghost
variables hold after the statements matching PC . Appendix A describes the concrete grammar for rules used in
our implementation.
As an example, Fig. 2 contains the rules for our alternating bit protocol. Rule (1) is triggered by the start
of the program, denoted by the special pattern ε. The hypothesis of this rule is empty, i.e., true. This rule says
that on all paths from the start of the program, send() must be called, and its second argument must point
to a 4-byte block containing the value 1. We can see that this rule is satisﬁed by statement 2 in Fig. 1. As a side
effect, the successful conclusion of rule (1) sets the ghost variable n to 1. Thus the value of n corresponds to
the data stored in val. Notice that there is a call to send() in statement 7 that could match the conclusion
pattern—but it does not, because we interpret patterns in rules to always mean the ﬁrst occurrence of a pattern
on a path.
Rule (2) is triggered by a call to recv(). It says that if recv() is called, then assuming that the value n is
received in the ﬁrst four bytes of in, the function send() must eventually be called with in+ 1 as an argument,
and as a side effect the value of n is incremented. Similarly to rule (1), this rule matches the ﬁrst occurrence of
send() following recv(). In our example code this rule is not satisﬁed. Suppose rule (1) has triggered once,
so the value of n is 1, and we trigger rule (2) in statement 4. Then if we assume n is received in statement 4, then
statement 7 will send n+ 2. Hence Pistachio signals a rule violation on this line.
Suppose instead that the implementation had been correct (line 6 had incremented val by 1), and rule (2)
had succeeded. Then as a side effect of satisfying rule (2), we would set n = 2 on line 7 and continue iterat-
ing the body of the loop, which matches rule (2) again, this time with a different value of n. We would then
need to continue iterating to check that the rule was satisﬁed again. Since this process could continue indeﬁ-
nitely, Pistachio repeats the check until it either ﬁnds a ﬁxpoint or until it iterates a ﬁxed maximum number of
times.
Finally, rule (3) is triggered on the same call to recv() in statement 4. It says that if we assume the value
of n is not received in in, then eventually send() is called with n as the argument. This rule will be satisﬁed by
the implementation, because when we take the false branch in statement 5 we will resend val, which always
contains n after rules (1) or (3) ﬁre.
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2.2. Developing rule-based Speciﬁcations
As part of our experimental evaluation (Section 4), we developed rule-based speciﬁcations for the SSH2
protocol and the RCP protocol. In both cases we started with a speciﬁcation document such as an RFC or
IETF standard. We then developed rules from the textual descriptions in the document, using the following
three steps; Section 4.1 discusses the actual rule-based speciﬁcations we developed for our experiments.
Identifying patterns. The speciﬁcation writer can either choose the low-level communication primitives as the
primary patterns, as in Fig. 2, or write rules in terms of higher-level routines. We attempted both approaches
when developing our speciﬁcations, but decided in favor of the ﬁrst method for more future portability. This
approach allowed us to use a single speciﬁcation for checking both LSH and OpenSSH, which use different
wrapper functions around the same low-level send and receive primitives.
Deﬁning the rules. The main task in constructing a rule-based speciﬁcation is, of course, determining the basic
rules. The speciﬁcation writer ﬁrst needs to read the standards document carefully to discover what data is
communicated and how it is represented. Then to discover the actual rules they should study the sections of the
speciﬁcation document that describe the protocol’s behavior. We found that phrases containing must are good
candidates for such rules. (For a discussion of terms such as must, may, and should in RFC documents, see RFC
2223 [12].)
For instance, as we read the SSH2 standard we learned that the message format for SSH user authentication
starts with the message type, followed by the user name, service name, and method name. Furthermore, we
found that the use of “none” as the authentication method is strongly discouraged by the speciﬁcation except
for debugging purposes. This suggested a potential security property: to prevent anonymous users from obtain-
ing remote shells, we should ensure that if we receive a user authentication request containing the none method,
we must return SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE . Once we determine this rule, it is easy to encode it in
Pistachio’s notation, given our knowledge of SSH message formats.
Describing state. Finally, as we are constructing the rules, we may discover that some protocol steps are
state-based. For instance, in the SSH2 protocol, any banner message has to be sent before the server sends
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS. To keep track of whether we have sent the success message, we intro-
duce a new ghost variable called successSent that is initially 0 (here we assume for simplicity that we only have
one client). We modify our rules to set successSent to 1 or 0 in the appropriate cases. Then the condition on
banner messages can be stated as Given that successSent is 1 and for any message received, the output message
type is different from SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER. Our experience is that coming up with the ghost
variables is the least-obvious part of writing a speciﬁcation and requires some insight. In the SSH2 and RCP
protocols, the state of the protocol usually depends on the previous message that was sent, and so our rules use
ghost variables to track the last message.
3. Static analysis of protocol source code
Given a set of rules as described in Section 2 and the source code of a C program, Pistachio performs static
analysis to check that the program obeys the speciﬁed rules. Pistachio uses abstract interpretation [7] to symbol-
ically execute source code. The basic idea is to associate a set of facts with each point during execution. In our
system, the facts we need to keep track of are the predicates in the rules and anything that might be related to
them. Each statement in the program can be thought of as a transfer function [13], which is a “fact transformer”
that takes the set of facts that hold before the statement and determines the facts that hold immediately after:
– After an assignment statement var = expr, we ﬁrst remove any previous facts about var and then add the fact
var = expr. For example, consider the code in Fig. 1 again. If before statement 6, {val = n} is the set of facts
that hold, after the assignment in statement 6 the set {val = n+ 2} holds. Pointers and indirect assignments
are handled similarly, as discussed below.
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Fig. 3. Static checking of example program.
– If we see a conditional if (p) s1 else s2, we add the fact that p holds on the true branch, and that ¬p holds on
the false branch. For example, at the beginning of statement 6 in Fig. 1, we can always assume recval = val,
since to reach this statement the condition in statement 5 must have been true.
– If we see a function call f(x1, ..., xn), we propagate facts from the call site through the body of f and back to
the caller. In other words, we treat the program as if all functions are inlined. As discussed below, we bound
the number of times we visit recursive functions to prevent inﬁnite looping, although recursive functions are
rare in practice for network protocol implementations.
Facts in Pistachio can use most of the arithmetic and comparison expressions supported by C, including the
address-of operator &. Internally, Pistachio represents all variables in memory as byte arrays, and facts can use
the notation var[i..j] to denote the number represented by bytes i through j of var. Pistachio facts may also use
a len operator, which returns the length of a string variable. A detailed grammar for Pistachio rules is given in
Appendix A.
We perform our analysis on a standard control-ﬂow graph (CFG) constructed from the program source code.
In the CFG, each statement forms a node, and there is an edge from s1 to s2 if statement s1 occurs immediately
before statement s2. For example, Fig. 3(a) gives the CFG for the program in Fig. 1.
Fig. 4 presents our symbolic execution algorithm more formally. The goal of this algorithm is to update Out,
a mapping such that Out(s) is the set of facts that deﬁnitely hold just after statement s. The input to FactDeri-
vation is an initial mapping Out, a set of starting statements S , and a set of ending statements T . The algorithm
simulates the execution of the program from statements in S to statements in T , updating Out as a side effect as
it executes. In this pseudocode, we write pred(s) and succ(s) for the predecessor and successor nodes of s in the
CFG. Our algorithm uses an automatic theorem prover to determine which way conditional branches are taken.
We write Theorem-prover(p) for the result of trying to prove p . This function may return yes if p is provably
true, no if p is provably false, or maybe if the theorem prover cannot show either.
In Fig. 4, we use a worklist Q of statements, initialized on line 1 to S . We repeatedly pick statements from
the worklist until it is empty. When we reach a statement in T on line 6, we stop propagation along that path.
Because the set of possible facts is large (most likely inﬁnite), simulation might not terminate if the code has
a loop. Thus on line 10 we heuristically stop iterating once we have visited a statement max_pass times, where
max_pass is a predetermined constant bound. Based on our experiments, we set max_pass to 75. We settled on
this value empirically by observing that if we vary the number of iterations, then the overall false positive and
false negative rates from Pistachio rarely changed after 75 iterations in our experiments.
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Fig. 4. Symbolic execution algorithm.
On line 5 we compute the set In of facts from the predecessors of s in the CFG. If the predecessor was
a conditional, then we also add in the appropriate guard based on whether s is on the true or false branch.
Then we apply a transfer function that depends on statement s. Lines 13–15 handle simple assignments, which
kill and add facts as described earlier, and then add successor statements to the worklist. Lines 16–24 handle
conditionals. Here we use an automatic theorem prover to prune impossible code paths. If the guard p holds in
the current state, then we only add s1 to the worklist, and if ¬p holds then we only add s2 to the worklist. If we
cannot prove either, i.e., we do not know which path we will take, then we add both s1 and s2 to the worklist.
Lines 25–35 handle function calls. We compute a renaming map between the actual and formal parameters of
f , and then recursively simulate f from its entry node, whose predecessor is temporarily set to include pred(s),
to its exit nodes, which are return statements plus the last statement in the function body. We start simulation
in state map(Out), which contains the facts in Out renamed by map. Then the state after the call returns is the
intersection of the states at all possible exits from the function, with the inverse mapping map
−1
applied.
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Fig. 5. Fact substitution algorithm.
Finally, just before FactDerivation continues with the next statement on the worklist, it performs fact substi-
tution on Out(s) on line 36. Fig. 5 deﬁnes the fact substitution algorithm, which expands equalities. The input
to the algorithm is a set of facts F . The algorithm initializes worklist Q to F on line 1. Then on lines 4–10, we
iteratively remove a single fact f from Q and replace any variables var that occur in f according to equalities
var = expr, if any, in the remaining facts. (Here expr is a complex expression, and not just a variable.) Any
newly-derived facts are added back to F and Q.
Fact substitution is useful for preserving information across assignment statements. Consider the following
C code, where we have listed the facts that hold without fact substitution after each line:
1 b = c + 1; /* {b = c + 1} */
2 a = b + 1; /* {b = c + 1, a = b+ 1} */
3 b = c + 3; /* {b = c + 3} */
Here since statement 3 writes to b, when computing Out(3), we ﬁrst killed facts about b from the incoming
fact set Out(2), and then added the fact generated by the assignment.
If instead we use our fact substitution algorithm, we derive the following facts after each program point:
1 b = c + 1; /* {b = c + 1} */
2 a = b + 1; /* {b = c + 1, a = b+ 1, a = (c + 1)+ 1} */
3 b = c + 3; /* {b = c + 3, a = (c + 1)+ 1} */
Here at the end of statement 2, we substituted for b in the fact a = b+ 1, producing the new fact a = (c + 1)+ 1.
Since this new fact does not contain b, it is not killed by the assignment in line 3. Thus FactSubstitution helps us
preserve implied equalities even when facts are killed by assignments. Note that FactSubstitution is not complete
in any sense—because it iterates through F only once, it may miss transitively applied equalities, and the output
of FactSubstitution depends on the order the facts are visited in. Moreover, in pathological cases the algorithm
might not terminate. However, it has proven useful in practice for improving the precision of Pistachio, and it
always terminated for our experiments.
Handling other features C includes a number of language features not covered in Fig. 4. Pistachio uses CIL [14]
as a front-end, which internally simpliﬁesmanyC constructs by introducing temporary variables and translating
loops into canonical form. We unroll loops up to max_pass times in an effort to improve precision. However,
as discussed in Section 3.2, we attempt to ﬁnd a ﬁxpoint during unrolling process and stop if we can do so, i.e.,
if we can ﬁnd a loop invariant.
C also includes pointers and a number of unsafe features, such as type casts and unions. Pistachio tracks facts
about pointers during its simulation, and all C data ismodeled as arrays of bytes with bounds information.When
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Fig. 6. Algorithm for checking a single rule.
there is an indirect assignment through a pointer, Pistachio uses the current set of facts to determine what the
pointer points to, and then updates facts about the pointed-to variable appropriately. There are two potential
sources of unsoundness for such indirect updates: First, if we lose facts about a pointer when we intersect fact
sets at a join point, we will simply ignore writes through that pointer. Second, if we stop symbolic execution of
a loop after max_pass iterations, we may retain facts about pointers that are inaccurate, causing writes through
that pointer to update the wrong variables. Neither of these issues has been a problem in practice.
Pistachio only derives a fact if the theorem prover can show that the write is within bounds, and otherwise
kills all existing facts about the array. Note that even though a buffer overﬂow may modify other memory, we
do not kill other facts, which is unsound but helps reduce false positives. Also, since all C data is represented as
byte arrays, type casts are implicitly handled as well, as long we can determine at analysis time the allocation
size for each type, which Pistachio could always do in our experiments. In addition, in order to reduce false
positives Pistachio assumes that variables are initialized with 0’s, even when locally scoped.
Pistachio assumes that code is single-threaded, and is not generally sound in the presence of multi-threading,
since it does not simulate thread interleavings. However, it can still be used quite effectively on multi-threaded
programs ifweassume that any threads are completely independent anddonot share any communication-related
state, as is the case for our SSH benchmarks.
In the next sections, we illustrate the use of FactDerivation during the process of checking the alternating bit
protocol from Fig. 2.
3.1. Checking a single rule
Given the FactDerivation algorithm, we can now present our algorithm for checking that the code obeys
a single rule R of the form (PH ,H) ⇒ (PC ,C ,G). Assume that we are given a set of statements S that match
PH . Then to check R, we need to simulate the program forward from the statements in S using FactDerivation.
We check that we can reach statements matching PC along all paths and that the conclusion C holds at those
statements. Fig. 6 gives our formal algorithm CheckSingleRule for carrying out this process.
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The input to CheckSingleRule is a rule R, an initial set of facts Out, and a set of starting statements S . For all
statements in S , on line 3 we add to their facts the assumptions H and any facts derived from pattern matching
S against PH ; we denote this latter set of facts by PH (s). On line 5 we search forward along all program paths
until we ﬁrst ﬁnd the conclusion pattern PC . If there is some path from S along which we cannot ﬁnd a match to
PC , we exit on line 6, reporting that the rule is not satisﬁed. Otherwise, on line 7 we perform symbolic execution
using FactDerivation to update Out. On line 8, we use the theorem prover to check whether the conclusion C
holds at the statements that match PC . If they do then the rule is satisﬁed, and lines 11–12 update Out(s′) with
facts for ghost variables. We also remove any facts about pattern variables (in and out in our examples) from
Out (line 14), return T , and indicate the rule was satisﬁed. Otherwise on line 18, we return T but report that the
rule was not satisﬁed.
Note that pattern variables (such as in and out in our examples) that occur in a rule R have a scope limited to
the program paths followed by Pistachio to verify R. Once the veriﬁcation is complete (line 14), all facts about
pattern variables are removed. On the other hand, ghost variables (such as n in our examples) have a global
scope. This means that when Pistachio encounters a ghost variable gvar, facts about it will persist between rule
ﬁrings and can only be “killed” by the successful veriﬁcation of another rule that modiﬁes gvar. Pistachio also
kills facts about C variables when they go out of scope.
We illustrate using CheckSingleRule to check rule (1) from Fig. 2 on the CFG in Fig. 3(a). The ﬁrst block in
Fig. 3(b) lists the steps taken by the algorithm. We will discuss the remainder of this ﬁgure in Section 3.2.
In rule (1), the hypothesis pattern PH is the start of the program, and the set of assumptions H is empty. The
conclusion C of this rule is out[0..3] = 1, where out matches the second argument passed to a call to send().
Thus to satisfy this rule, we need to show that out[0..3] = 1 at statement 2 in Fig. 1. We begin by adding H and
PH (0), which in this case are empty, toOut(0), the set of facts at the beginning of the program,which is also empty.
We trace the program from this point forward using FactDerivation. In particular, Out(1) = Out(2) = {val = 1}.
At statement 2 we match the call to send() against PC , and thus we also have fact &val = out. Then we ask the
theorem prover to show Out(2) ∧ {&val = out} ⇒ C . In this case the proof succeeds, and so the rule is satisﬁed,
and we set ghost variable n to 1.
3.2. Checking a set of rules
Finally, we develop our algorithm for checking a set of rules. Consider again the rules in Fig. 2. Notice that
rules (2) and (3) both depend on n, which is set in the conclusion of rules (1) and (2). Thus we need to check
whether rules (2) or (3) are triggered on any program path after we update n, and if they are, then we need to
check whether they are satisﬁed. Since rule (2) depends on itself, we in fact need to iterate.
Fig. 7 gives our algorithm for checking a set of rules. The input is a set of rulesR that need to be checked. On
lines 2–3, we create an initial Out, which is empty for the initial statement in the program, and , the set of all
facts, for every other program point. The main body of the algorithm maintains a worklist W containing tuples
(R,Out, S), where R is a rule to be checked starting at statements in S with the set of facts Out. Line 4 initializes
W to be empty, and then for each rule R that has (ε,∅) as the hypothesis (and so matches the beginning of the
program and has no hypotheses), line 7 adds (R,Out, {start}) toW . Notice that this means a copy ofOut is stored
in the worklist for each initial rule. Rules with the empty hypothesis are also removed from R, since they will
not be checked again.
The main body of the algorithm (lines 11–35) iteratively removes an element (R,Out, S) from the worklist
and checks the rule. Note that because rule dependencies may be cyclic, we may visit a rule multiple times,
and as in Fig. 6 we terminate iteration once we have visited a rule max_pass times (lines 13–16). On line 18 we
trace forward from S to ﬁnd all statements T that match PH . Then on line 19 we perform fact derivation to
update Out. This updates only the local copy of Out we removed from the worklist, and not any other fact sets.
The set T now contains the statements where we should start checking the rule R. First, however, lines 20—24
remove any statements from T for which the rule hypotheses and the current state are provably inconsistent (i.e.,
imply false), meaning that the rule cannot ﬁre. Assuming that T is non-empty after this process, line 26 invokes
CheckSingleRule, which updatesOut and returns a new set of statementsU and a status. If the rule was satisﬁed,
then lines 28–30 add (R,Out,U) to the worklist for all rules R, so that future iterations of the loop will check
any new rules that may ﬁre starting from U . If the rule was not satisﬁed, then line 32 reports a rule violation.
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Fig. 7. Algorithm for checking a set of rules.
We illustrate the algorithm by tracing through the remainder of Fig. 3(b), which describes the execution of
CheckRuleSet on our example program. Observe that rule (1) has no assumptions and matches the beginning
of the program, hence it is initially added to W . The main loop of the algorithm removes ((1),Out, {start}) from
the worklist, and then calls CheckSingleRule. As described in Section 3.1, we satisfy rule (1) at statement 2, and
we set ghost variable n to 1. Let Out
′
be the current fact set. The we add ((2),Out
′
, {2}) and ((3),Out′, {2}) to the
worklist. (We do not add rule (1) to the worklist, because it matched the start of the program.) Thus either rule
(2) or rule (3) might ﬁre next.
Checking rule (3). Suppose we next remove ((3),Out
′
, {2}) from the worklist, meaning we check rule (3) start-
ing at statement 2, in state Out
′
, which has the ghost variable n set to 1. We perform symbolic execution forward
until we ﬁnd a statement that matches the hypothesis pattern of rule (3), which is statement 4. Now we check
that rule (3) should ﬁre, which it does, because the current state does not contradict the hypothesis in[0..3] /= n
(in fact, it does not say anything about in). Thus we add the hypothesis to our set of facts and continue forward.
When we reach statement 5, the theorem prover shows that the false branch will be taken, so we only continue
along that one branch—which is important, because if we followed the other branch we would not be able to
prove the conclusion. Taking the false branch, we fall through to statement 7, and the theorem prover concludes
that rule (3) holds. Since the rule is satisﬁed, we add back rules (2) and (3) to the worklist to be checked starting
at the bottom of the loop; we will come back to this below.
O. Udrea et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 130–157 141
Fig. 8. Example rule for library function calloc.
Checking rule (2). Next suppose we remove ((2),Out
′
, {2}) from the worklist, meaning that we need to now
check rule (2) starting where we left off at statement 2. Out
′
has n = 1 and val = 1 at statement 2. We continue
forward, match the hypothesis of rule (2) at statement 4, and then this time at the conditional we conclude that
the true branch is taken, hence val becomes 3 at statement 7. Now the conclusion of the rule cannot be proven,
so we issue a warning that the protocol was violated at this statement.
Finding a ﬁxpoint. Suppose for illustration purposes that rule (2) had checked successfully, i.e., in statement
6, val was only incremented by one. Then at statement 7 we would have shown the conclusion and set ghost
variable n := out[0..3]. Then we would add ((2),Out′′, {7}) and ((3),Out′′, {7}) to the worklist, where Out′′ is the
state after rule (2) was checked. When we remove these elements from the worklist, we will recheck those rules
for the loop body with the new value of n, and then continue to repeat this process, leading to an inﬁnite loop,
cut off after max_pass times. A similar effect happens after checking rule (3) on the body of the loop.
However, notice that after one iteration, Out stabilizes. During the ﬁrst check of rule (2), we would have that
Out(2) = {n = val, val = 1}, which is the input fact set for statement 4. After rule (2) succeeds at statement 7, we
set n to val, and hence Out(7) = {n = val, val = 2}. Thus when we revisit statement 4, we intersect Out(2) and
Out(7), yielding the set {n = val}. This is, in fact, a loop invariant, and subsequent checks of rules (2) and (3) will
wind up re-checking the same rules in the same state, producing no new results.
Pistachio includes two features relating to ﬁxpoints that are not shown in our formal algorithms, because
they would obscure their structure. First, Pistachio stops iteration when it detects a ﬁxpoint, i.e., when we either
have already simulated forward from some point with the same set of facts, or when we have already checked
a rule at the same statement starting with the same set of facts. Second, in the cases where Pistachio does not
ﬁnd a ﬁxpoint, rather than intersecting fact sets on back edges, Pistachio performs loop unrolling. Loops are
unrolled until we either reach a ﬁxpoint, unroll a total of max_pass iterations, or provably exit the loop before
max_pass iterations are reached.We found that Pistachio was very often able to ﬁnd a ﬁxpoint and stop iterating
well before reaching max_pass in our experiments (Section 4.5).
4. Implementation and experiments
Pistachio is implemented in approximately 6000 lines of OCaml. We use CIL [14] to parse C programs and
the Darwin [15] automated theorem prover (for a discussion on the choice of theorem prover, see Appendix B).
Darwin is a sound, fully-automated theorem prover for ﬁrst-order clausal logic. Darwin can return either “yes,”
“no,” or “maybe” for each theorem. Pistachio conservatively reports a rule failure if the theorem prover cannot
prove that the facts derived starting from the hypothesis imply the conclusion.
To analyze realistic programs, Pistachio needs to model system libraries. Rather than analyze library source
code directly, which is not always available, Pistachio allows the user to provide a rule-based speciﬁcation for
library functions. For example, Fig. 8 gives a library rule that models calls to calloc. The pattern in the
hypothesis of the rule works just like a regular rule, matching a function call, here with nelems and elsize bound
to the parameters and out bound to its return value. Library rules only ﬁre if the predicates in the hypothesis are
implied by the current set of facts, and if they are, the conclusion facts are added directly after the call. (Note the
difference with a regular rule, where the hypothesis facts cannot be contradictory but are otherwise assumed, the
conclusion contains a pattern, and the conclusion facts must be proven when the patternmatches.) For example,
if Pistachio sees a call block = calloc(n, sz) at statement s, Pistachio asks the theorem prover to show
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In(s) ∧ (nelems = n) ∧ (elsize = sz) ∧ (out = block) ⇒ (nelems > 0) ∧ (elsize > 0)
If the answer is yes, then Pistachio adds the facts {block /= NULL,block[0..(n ∗ sz − 1)] = 0} to Out(s).
Otherwise the library rule is ignored. Notice that our rule for calloc assumes that inﬁnite memory is avail-
able.
For our experiments we wrote a total of 117 library rule speciﬁcations for 35 I/O and memory allocation
routines. Library speciﬁcations can also be used for user-deﬁned functions, in which case they override the
function deﬁnition. In our SSH2 experiments, we used 18 speciﬁcations for cryptographic functions, rather than
analyze their code. (Our speciﬁcations treat cryptographic functions as if they perform no encryption, since
that is not our concern in these experiments.) There are some library functions we cannot fully model in our
framework, e.g., geterrno(), which potentially depends on any other library call. Pistachio assumes there are
no side-effects from calls to library functions without speciﬁcations, and Pistachio assumes nothing about the
return value of the call. For example, Pistachio assumes that conditionals based on the result of geterrno()
may take either branch, which can reduce precision.
4.1. Core rule sets
We evaluated Pistachio by analyzing the LSH [16] and OpenSSH [17] implementations of SSH2 and the
RCP implementation from Cygwin’s inetutils package. We chose these systems because of their extensive bug
databases and the number of different versions available.
We created rule-based speciﬁcations by following the process described in Section 2.2. Our (partial) spec-
iﬁcation for SSH2 totaled 96 rules, and the one for RCP totaled 58 rules. The rules for SSH2 covered the
authentication, connection and transport parts of the protocol, but none of its extensions (such as key ex-
change protocols). Because the rules describe particular protocol details and are interdependent, it is difﬁ-
cult to correlate individual rules with general correctness or security properties. In Fig. 9, we give a rough
classiﬁcation of the rules in our speciﬁcations, list how many rules in each speciﬁcation fall into each cate-
gory, and show example rules from SSH2. These example rules are taken directly from our experiments—
the only changes are that we have reformatted them in more readable notation, rather than in the concrete
grammar used in our implementation, and we have used send and recv rather than the actual function
names.
There are four rule categories, based on functional behavior:
– Message structure and data transfer includes rules that relate to the format, structure, and restrictions on
messages in the protocols. The example rule requires that any prompt sent to keyboard interactive clients
in SSH2 not be the empty string. RCP rules in this category specify properties such as payload length or
structure of messages about negotiated transmission parameters.
– Compatibility includes rules about backwards compatibility with earlier protocol versions. The example rule
places a requirement on sending an identiﬁcation string when SSH2 is in compatibility mode with SSH1.
– Functionality includes rules about what abilities should or should not be supported. The example rule requires
that an SSH2 implementation not allow the “none” authentication method. RCP rules in this category check
that the required authentication and encryption methods are available.
– Protocol logic contains the most complex rules, and rules in this category were the most time-consuming
to develop. These rules require that the proper response is sent for each received message. The ﬁrst exam-
ple SSH2 rule requires that the server provide an adequate response to TCP/IP forwarding requests with a
value of 0 for port. The second SSH2 rule requires that the server replies to all global requests that have the
wantreply ﬂag set. RCP rules in this category specify how the implementation should respond to expected
and out-of-phase data and control messages, or the way transmission parameters such as payload size and
frequency are negotiated.
Based on our experience developing rules for SSH and RCP, we believe that the process does not require
any specialized knowledge other than familiarity with the rule-based language grammar and the speciﬁcation
document. It took the authors less than 7 h to develop each of our SSH2 and RCP speciﬁcations.
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Fig. 9. Rule categorization and counts, and example rules for SSH2.
Of course, we did not get the rules entirely right the ﬁrst time we wrote them down. We debugged our set of
rules for SSH by identifying a set of 20 bugs they should catch and then running Pistachio on the corresponding
implementations. We selected our set of bugs from four LSH versions (0.1.9, 0.5, 0.7.3, and 1.2.5) that were not
used in our evaluation, and we chose bugs that were local to those versions—i.e., they did not appear in or
persist to the next version of the protocol. As a result of this process, we made modiﬁcations to 9 of the 87 initial
SSH2 rules. The process took approximately 1.5 h out of the total 7 h to develop and debug the speciﬁcation.
We repeated the same process for RCP using 14 bugs from versions 0.7.1 and 0.9 (which were also not used in
our evaluation). As a result, we modiﬁed 6 of the 51 RCP rules, and the debugging process took roughly 45 min.
The value of 75 for max_pass was determined on the same set of versions used to debug the rules.
We debugged Pistachio itself on simpliﬁed versions of the sliding window protocol. Since sliding window is
the basis of many modern protocols (including TCP/IP), variations of it (often simpliﬁed to one-bit message
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payloads) have been thoroughly studied in the literature [18], both from the point of view of correctness and
that of the implementation. We debugged Pistachio on the Stop-And-Wait, Go-Back-n, and Selective-Repeat
variations of the protocol from ﬁve implementations freely available on the web. When we performed our
experiments on LSH and RCP, we also found an ﬁxed a few other bugs in our implementation.
Generally the rules are slightly more complex than is shown in Fig. 9. On average, rules in the SSH2 speciﬁca-
tion include 11 hypothesis and ﬁve conclusion facts, and rules in the RCP speciﬁcation include nine hypothesis
and four conclusion facts. Originally, we started with a rule set derived directly from speciﬁcation documents,
which was able to catch many but not all bugs, and then we added some additional rules (a little over 10%
more per speciﬁcation) to look for some speciﬁc known bugs. These additional rules produced about 20% of
the warnings from Pistachio (Section 4.5). Generally, the rules written from the speciﬁcation document tend to
catch missing functionality and message format related problems, but are less likely to catch errors relating to
compatibility problems or unsafe use of library functions. The process of extending the initial set of rules proved
fairly easy, since speciﬁc information about the targeted bugs was available from the respective bug databases.
After developing our SSH2 rules, including the extra 10% mentioned above, we conducted an initial experi-
ment in which we applied them to LSH [10]. Subsequently, we have ported the rules to also work on OpenSSH,
and in this paper we are using the new set of rules for both LSH and OpenSSH. Since the rules were based
on the speciﬁcation document and did not depend on speciﬁc programming constructs, 94 of our original 96
SSH2 rules could be applied to OpenSSH with no changes. The remaining two rules needed to change because
of differences in how the LSH and OpenSSH authors interpreted the protocol description. In particular, the
SSH2 connection protocol speciﬁcation [6] states:
X11 connection forwarding should stop when the session channel is closed. However, already opened
forwardings should not be automatically closed when the session channel is closed.
Our set of rules targeting LSH assumed that existing forwardings are not in fact closed, which holds in that
implementation. OpenSSH, however, does close existing forwardings when the session channel is closed, if they
have been idle for a predeﬁned period of time. Adjusting for this difference accounts for the two rule changes.
The experimental results in the following sections used the revised SSH2 rules for both LSH and OpenSSH.
4.2. Results for core rule sets
We started with initial speciﬁcations for the SSH2 protocols (87 rules) and the RCP protocol (51 rules), with
“core rules” based only on speciﬁcation documents. In Section 4.5 we discuss extending these rules to target
particular bugs. Using these speciﬁcations, we ran our tool against selected versions of LSH, OpenSSH, and
RCP. We used the same speciﬁcation for all versions of the code, and we ran Pistachio with max_pass set to 75.
Fig. 10 presents our analysis results. For each program version, we list the lines of code, omitting comments
and blank lines, and the running time of Pistachio. We only include code analyzed by Pistachio and involved in
the rules. We also list Pistachio’s running time, in seconds. The running times were measured on a Pentium IV
3Ghz machine with 1GB of RAM running SuSE Linux 9.3. The times were measured as an average of ﬁve runs,
and include the time for checking the core rules plus the additional rules discussed in Section 4.5. In all cases
the running times were under 1 min.
The remaining rowsmeasure Pistachio’s effectiveness.We list the number of warnings generated by Pistachio,
the number of actual bugs those warnings correspond to, the number of bugs in the project’s bug database for
that version, and the number of false positives—warnings that do not correspond to bugs in the code—and false
negatives—bugs in the database we did not ﬁnd. Note that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence
between bugs and Pistachio warnings. When counting bugs in the database, we count only reports for compo-
nents covered by our speciﬁcations. For instance, we only include bugs in SSH2’s authentication, transport and
connection protocol code, but not any code that is part of the key exchange protocol. We also did not include
reports that appeared to be feature requests or other issues.
We found that most of the warnings reported by Pistachio correspond to bugs that were in the database. For
the core rule sets, the average false negative rates were quite low (4% for LSH, 9% for OpenSSH, and 3% for
RCP), and the average false positive rates were fairly low (35% for LSH, 38% for OpenSSH, and 42% for RCP).
We were pleasantly surprised by the very low false negative rate, especially since Pistachio is neither sound nor
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Fig. 10. Pistachio results with core rule sets.
complete.We also noted that Pistachio is able to handle pointer arithmetic and aliasing very well, as a signiﬁcant
percentage of warnings and corresponding bugs are related to data access. These results suggest that Pistachio
can be an effective tool for ﬁnding bugs in network protocol implementations.
Section 4.4 discusses some of the bugs we found in detail. Pistachio discovered two apparently new bugs in
LSH version 2.0.1. The ﬁrst is a buffer overﬂow in buffers reserved for passing environment variables in the SSH
Transport protocol. The second involves an incorrectly formed authentication failure message when using PKI.
We have not conﬁrmed these bugs; we sent an email to the LSH mailing list with a report, but it appears that
the project has not been maintained recently, and we did not receive a response.
4.3. Breakdown of warnings and bugs
Next, we wanted to get a ﬁner view of how Pistachio behaves, to understand two things: ﬁrst, are there partic-
ular categories of rules that tend to result in more warnings than other categories? And second, does Pistachio
tend to ﬁnd certain kinds of bugs more than other kinds?
To answer the ﬁrst question, we broke down the warning counts by the rule categorization in Fig. 9. The
results are shown in the left half of Fig. 11. For each version, listed along the bottom, we show the number of
warnings due to violations of protocol logic, functionality, compatibility, and message structure and transfer
rules. From these graphs, we can see that the category with the fewest warnings overall is compatibility, but
there are no clear standouts among the other rule categories. There is one interesting difference between RCP
and the SSH2: for the simpler RCP protocol, the number of protocol logic warnings tends to be lower than
the number of warnings related to message structure and transfer, while this situation is often reversed for the
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Fig. 11. Warnings by Pistachio and bugs detected for LSH, OpenSSH and RCP.
SSH2 protocol implementations. Overall, our results show that each of the different kinds of rules have a good
chance of catching programmer mistakes; or, put another way, that programmers make mistakes that span all
rule categories. These graphs also show quite clearly that the total number of warnings goes down over time,
which makes sense, since we hope that software improves as it matures.
While measuring how often rule categories are violated gives us some sense of how the warnings are distrib-
uted by rule, it does not always tell us about the underlying defects in the program. For example, a rule failure
could be caused by missing parentheses in the code, by a mis-constructed if-then-else, or by a multitude of other
mistakes. Thus, to answer our second question, which defects cause rule violations, we classiﬁed bugs found by
Pistachio into a subset of Beizer’s bug taxonomy [9], one popular classiﬁcation system.
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Beizer’s taxonomy is large and complex, containing eight main categories, three of which, Structural, Data,
and Implementation, contain elements related to code (as opposed to speciﬁcations, requirements, etc.). Within
these top-level categories, we selected second-level categories that related to the kinds of problems Pistachio
found. We divided defects into the following ﬁve categories:
– Control ﬂow and sequencing contains bugs related to branch and loop conditions and statements. Examples
include missing or misplaced break statements, wrong initial values of terminal conditions for loops, and
incorrect conditions for exceptionally exiting loops.
– Processing refers to errors in expressions and computation in general. Examples include misplaced parenthe-
ses in an arithmetic expression, insufﬁcient or excessive precision, incorrect bitwise masks, and cutting off
the beginning or end or a string.
– Data deﬁnition and declaration refers to bugs related to data declaration and initialization. Examples include
forgetting to initialize a variable, incorrect data types (e.g., short instead of long), global/local inconsistencies
or conﬂicts, and incorrect allocation type (e.g., static when it should have been dynamic).
– Data access and handling refers primarily to indirect memory accesses. Examples include writing through an
invalid pointer, incorrect type casts, and object boundary errors.
– Interface refers to errors in the passing of parameters to user-deﬁned or library methods. Examples include
passing fewer variables to sprintf than type speciﬁers, duplicate or spurious method calls, and accessing
the wrong return parameter.
Deciding which category a bug falls into is an inexact process. For example, suppose in a loop we have
moved a pointer past the end of an array and we attempt to write through that pointer. This is clearly a buffer
overﬂow, but in the taxonomy, it could be categorized as a control ﬂow and sequencing bug, since the termination
condition on the loop was incorrect; or as a data deﬁnition and declaration bug, if the problem was that the array
was declared with too small a size; or as a data access and handling bug, since we attempted to write through an
invalid pointer. When categorizing bugs, we always tried to place the bug in the last category in which it ﬁts, in
the order the categories are listed above. Thus in our example situation, the bug would fall under data access
and handling.
The right side of Fig. 11 shows the results of this classiﬁcation; we also include false negatives for comparison.
These graphs show that no one kind of defect dominates overall, though there are relatively few interface bugs.
For LSH and OpenSSH, processing bugs are often the most numerous, where RCP tends to have the most
bugs in data access and handling and control ﬂow and sequencing, though these trends are subtle and may not be
signiﬁcant. Beizer reports [9] that the ﬁve defect categories we chose account for roughly 61% of total bugs in
software, according to data collected between 1982 and 1988 from US defense, aerospace, and telecommunica-
tion companies. Interestingly, in Beizer’s data, all ﬁve categories are roughly equivalent in their contribution,
whereas as we just observed, we found relatively few interface bugs. We suspect that this is related to the scale
of the code in our experiments. The protocol implementations are comprised of only a few modules, which were
likely written by only one or a few people, minimizing the chance of a miscommunication about an interface.
Excepting interface bugs, our results suggest that problems in network protocol implementations are due to the
usual range of programming mistakes.
4.4. Discussion
Our results show that Pistachio can ﬁnd a wide variety of bugs in network protocol implementations. In this
section, we discuss the process a user needs to following in order to understand the output of Pistachio, i.e., to
determine whether a warning corresponds to a potential bug. We also describe several sample bugs we found in
LSH,discussPistachio’s false positives andnegatives, and examine the security implicationsof thebugswe found.
Understanding Pistachio warnings We found that the best way to determine whether a rule violation corre-
sponds to a bug is to trace the fact derivation process in reverse, using logs produced by Pistachio that give
Out for each analyzed statement. We start from a rule failure at a conclusion, and then examine the preceding
statements to see whether they directly contradict those facts. If so, then we have found what we think is a bug,
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and we look in the bug database to determine whether we are correct. If the preceding statements do not directly
contradict the facts, we continue tracing backward, using Out to help understand the results, until we either ﬁnd
a contradiction or reach the hypothesis, in which case we have found a false positive. If the conclusion pattern is
not found on all program paths, we use the same process to determine why those paths were not pruned during
fact derivation.
As a concrete example of this process, consider the second rule in Fig. 9. This rule is derived from section 5 of
the SSH2 Transport Protocol speciﬁcation [6], and Pistachio reported that this rule was violated for LSH imple-
mentation 0.2.9. In particular, Pistachio could not prove that out[len(out)− 2] = CR and out[len(out)− 1] = LF
at the rule conclusion. Fig. 12(a) shows the code (slightly simpliﬁed for readability) where the bug was reported.
Statement 24 matches the conclusion pattern (here fmsgsend is a wrapper around send), and so that is where
we begin. Statement 24 has two predecessors in the control-ﬂow graph, one for each branch of the conditional
statement 8. Looking through the log, we determined that the required facts to show the conclusion were in
Out(19) but not in Out(13). We examined statement 13, and observed that if it is executed (i.e., if the conditional
statement 8 takes the true branch), then line 24 will send a disconnect message, which is incorrect. Thus we
backtracked to statement 8 and determined that protomsg.proto_ver<1 could not be proved either true or false
based on In(8), which was correctly derived from the hypothesis (asserted in Out(3)). Thus we determined that
we found a bug, in which the implementation could send an SSH_DISCONNECT message for clients with ver-
sions below 1.0, although the protocol speciﬁes that the server must send the identiﬁcation ﬁrst, independently
of the other party’s version. We then conﬁrmed this bug against the LSH bug database. This bug falls under
control ﬂow and sequencing, since the if branch in the code should be removed.
While it is non-trivial to determine whether the reports issued by Pistachio correspond to bugs, we found
it was generally straightforward to follow the process described above. Usually the number of facts we were
trying to trace was small (at most 2–3), and the number of preceding statements was also small (rarely larger
than 2). In the vast majority of the cases, it took on the order of minutes to trace through a Pistachio warning,
though in some cases it took up to an hour, often due to insufﬁciently speciﬁed library functions that produced
many paths. In general, the effort required to understand a Pistachio warning is directly proportional to the
complexity of the code making up a communication round.
More sample bugs found by Pistachio Fig. 12(b) shows a violation of the example functionality rule in Fig. 9.
This code is from LSH version 0.1.3. In this case, a message is received at statement 1, and Pistachio assumes
the rule hypotheses, which indicate that the message is a user authorization request. Then a success message is
always sent in statement 16. However, the rule speciﬁes that the “none” authentication method must result in
a failure response. Tracing back through the code, we discovered that the else statement on line 10 allows the
“none” method to succeed. This statement should have checked for the “hostbased” authentication method,
and indeed this corresponds to a bug in the LSH bug database. This is also a control ﬂow and sequencing bug, as
there is a missing branch case for “hostbased” authentication.
Fig. 12(c) shows a buffer overﬂow detected by Pistachio in LSH version 0.9.1. Buffer overﬂows are detected
indirectly during rule checking. Recall that when Pistachio sees a write to an array that it cannot prove is in-
bounds, it kills facts about the array. Thus sometimes when we investigated why a conclusion was not provable,
we discovered it was due to an out-of-bounds write corresponding to a buffer overﬂow. When we ran Pistachio
on the code in Fig. 12(c), we found a violation of the ﬁrst protocol logic rule in Fig. 9, as follows. At statement
3, Pistachio assumes the hypothesis of this rule, including that the wantreply ﬂag (corresponding to in[15]) is set,
and that the message is for TCP forwarding. Under these assumptions, Pistachio reasons that the true branch of
statement 8 is taken. But then line 10 performs a strcpy into laddr, which is a ﬁxed-sized locally-allocated array.
The function getstrﬁeld() (not shown) extracts a string out of the receivedmessage, but that stringmay bemore
than 17 bytes. Thus at the call to strcpy, there may be a write outside the bounds of laddr, and so we kill facts
about laddr. Then at statement 13, we call create_forwarding(), which expects laddr to be null-terminated—and
since we do not know whether there is a null byte within laddr, Pistachio determines that create_forwarding()
might return false, causing us to return from this code without executing the call to fmsgsend in statement 24.
This bug falls under the data declaration and deﬁnition category, since the statically allocated laddr should in this
case be dynamic based on the length of the message payload (or alternatively, the payload should be truncated).
In this case, if Pistachio had been able to reason at statement 10 that laddr was null-terminated, then it would
not have issued a warning. Although the return statement 14 might seem to be reachable in that case, looking
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Fig. 12. Sample bugs in LSH.
inside of create_forwarding(), we ﬁnd that can only occur if LSH runs out of ports, and our model for library
functions assumes that this never happens. (Even if an ill-formed address is passed to create_forwarding(), it still
creates the forwarding for 0.0.0.0.) On the other hand, if create_forwarding() had relied on the length of laddr,
rather than it being null-terminated, then Pistachio would not have reported a warning here—even though there
still would be a buffer overﬂow in that case. Thus the ability to detect buffer overﬂows in Pistachio is somewhat
fragile, and it is a side effect of the analysis that they can be detected at all. Buffer overﬂows that do not result
in rule violations, or that occur in code we do not analyze, will go unnoticed.








































Fig. 13. Causes for false positives.
Finally, Fig. 12(d) shows a bug in LSH 0.9.1 found as a violation of the last rule in Fig. 9. The problem in this
code had to do with a library function, and this error, like a buffer overﬂow, was found as a side effect of rule
checking. In this code, wematched the hypothesis of the rule at statement 1, and then determined that the branch
on statement 7 may be taken. Thus one possible path leads to the call to popen in statement 10. In this case,
our model of popen requires that the second argument must be either “r” or “w,” or the call to popen yields an
undeﬁned result. Since before statement 10 fmod was set to “rw,” Pistachio assumes that popen may return any
value, including null, and thus statement 11 may be executed and return without sending a reply message, thus
violating the rule conclusion. Note that our model of popen always succeeds if valid arguments are passed, and
thus if fmod were “r” or “w” a rule violation would not have been reported. This bug falls under the interface
category, since it involves incorrect function arguments.
False Positives and Negatives Fig. 13 breaks down the causes of false positives found in LSH, OpenSSH, and
RCP, averaged over all versions. The main cause of false positives is insufﬁcient speciﬁcation of library calls.
This is primarily due to the fact that library functions sometimes rely on external factors such as system state
(e.g., whether getenv() returns NULL or not depends on which environment variables are deﬁned) that cannot
be fully modeled using our rule-based semantics. For such functions, only partial speciﬁcations can be devised.
The remaining false positives are due to limitations of the theorem prover and to loop breaking, where we halt
iteration of our algorithm after max_pass times.
Besides false positives, Pistachio also has false negatives, as measured against the LSH, OpenSSH, and RCP
bug databases. From our experience, these are generally caused by either assumptions made when modeling
library calls, or by the fact that the rule sets are not complete. As an example of the ﬁrst case, we generally make
the simplifying assumption that on open() calls, there are sufﬁcient ﬁle handles available. This caused a false
negative for LSH version 0.1.3, where a misplaced open() call within a loop lead to the exhaustion of available
handles for certain SSH global requests.
Security implications As can be seen from the previous discussion, many of the bugs found by Pistachio have
obvious security implications. In general, categorizing a bug as security-relevant is difﬁcult, because bugs that
initially appear benign may introduce security vulnerabilities, and the deﬁnition of what is and is not a vulner-
ability depends on particular circumstances. We looked through the bug databases to determine which bugs
found by Pistachio are either clearly security-related by their nature or were documented as security-related. On
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average, we classiﬁed 30% of the true positive warnings (warnings that correspond to bugs) as security-related
for LSH, 28% for OpenSSH, and 23% for RCP.
Of the security-related bugs, 52% are buffer overﬂows (all of which we assume are security-related), 21% have
to do with access control (ensuring the user has sufﬁcient privileges before performing operations), and 18% are
compatibility problems. The last category does not directly violate security, but does impede the use of a secure
protocol. The remaining security-related bugs did not fall into any broader categories.
Our classiﬁcation of bugs as security-related has some uncertainty, because the bug databases might incor-
rectly categorize some non-exploitable bugs as security holes. Conversely, some bugs that are not documented
as being security-related might be exploitable by a sufﬁciently clever attacker. In general, any bug in a network
protocol implementation is undesirable.
4.5. Results for extended rule sets
When bugs are found in code, it is good software engineering practice to write regression tests to catch the
bug if it reappears. We hypothesized that in a similar way, Pistachio could be integrated into the development
lifecycle by writing “regression rules” that target known bugs.
We conducted a second set of exploratory experiments in which we extended our core rule-based speciﬁca-
tions to target bugs that they missed according to the bug databases. Our goal was to determine whether new
rules could catch these bugs. We added nine new rules to our SSH2 speciﬁcation, and seven new rules to our
RCP speciﬁcation, or roughly 10% more rules overall. The rules we needed to add were typically for features
that were strongly recommended but not required by the speciﬁcation, because it turned out that violations of
these recommendations were considered errors. One example is the recommendation that a proper disconnect
message be sent by the SSH server when authentication fails.
Fig. 14 shows the number of additional warnings, bugs, and false positives found by Pistachio with the extra
rules. We also break down the warnings and bugs as in Section 4.3; we do not graph the data since the numbers
are small. In this ﬁgure, zero values are entered as a dot.
The warnings and bugs span the gamut of our categorization, though there are almost no interface bugs.
Interestingly, the new SSH2 rules were determined by only looking at the LSH bug database, and yet they also
found additional bugs in OpenSSH. Overall, the additional rules account for under 20% of the total number of
warnings generated by Pistachio. Of the new warnings reported by Pistachio, approximately 17% had security
implications according to our classiﬁcation from Section 4.4, mostly related to access control issues and buffer
overﬂows. Fig. 14 also lists the number of false negatives that remain even after enriching the speciﬁcations.
Roughly half of the remaining false negatives are due to terminating iteration after max_pass times, and the
other half are due to aspects of the protocol our new rules still did not cover.
For the extended rules, we also measured how often we are able to compute a symbolic ﬁxpoint for loops
during our analysis. Recall that if we stop iteration of our algorithm after max_pass times then we could intro-
duce unsoundness, which accounts for approximately 28% of the false positives, as shown in Fig. 13. We found
that when max_pass is set to 75, we ﬁnd a ﬁxpoint before reaching max_pass in 250 out of 271 cases for LSH,
in 204 out of 252 for OpenSSH, and in 153 out of 164 cases for RCP. This suggests that our symbolic ﬁxpoint
computation is effective in practice.
5. Related work
Understanding the safety and robustness of network protocols is recognized as an important research area,
and the last decade has witnessed an emergence of many techniques for verifying protocols.
We are aware of only a few systems that, like Pistachio, directly check source code rather than abstractmodels
of protocols. CMC [1] and VeriSoft [19] both model check C source code by running the code dynamically on
hardware, and both have been used to check communication protocols. These systems execute the code in a
simulated environment in which the model checker controls the execution and interleaving of processes, each
of which represents a communication node. As the code runs, the model checker looks for invalid states that
violate user-speciﬁed assertions, which are similar to the rules in Pistachio. CMC has been successfully used to
check an implementation of the AODV routing protocol [1] and the Linux TCP/IP protocol [20].
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Fig. 14. Pistachio results with extended rule sets.
There are two main drawbacks to these approaches. First, they potentially suffer from the standard state
space explosion problem of model checking, because the number of program executions and interleavings is
extremely large. This is typical when model checking is used for data dependent properties, and both CMC
and VeriSoft use various techniques to limit their search. Second, these tools ﬁnd errors only if they actu-
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ally occur during execution, which depends on the number of simulated processes and on what search algo-
rithm is used. Pistachio makes different tradeoffs. Because we start from a set of rules describing the pro-
tocol, we need only perform symbolic execution on a single instance of the protocol rather than simulating
multiple communication nodes, which improves performance. The set of rules can be reﬁned over time to
ﬁnd known bugs and make sure that they do not appear again. We search for errors by program source
path rather than directly in the dynamic execution space, which means that in the best case we are able to
use symbolic information in the dataﬂow facts to compute ﬁxpoints for loops, though in the worst case we
unsafely cut off our search after max_pass iterations. Pistachio is also very fast, making it easy to use dur-
ing the development process. On the other hand, Pistachio’s rules cannot enforce the general kinds of tem-
poral properties that model checking can. We believe that ultimately the CMC and VeriSoft approach and
the Pistachio approach are complementary, and both provide increased assurance of the safety of a protocol
implementation.
Other researchers have proposed static analysis systems that have been applied to protocol source code.
MAGIC [21] extracts a ﬁnite model from a C program using various abstraction techniques and then veriﬁes the
model against the speciﬁcation of the program. MAGIC has been successfully used to check an implementation
of the SSL protocol. The SPIN [2] model checker has been used to trace errors in data communication protocols,
concurrent algorithms, and operating systems. It uses a high level language to specify system descriptions but
also provides direct support for the use of embedded C code as part of model speciﬁcations. However, due to the
state space explosion problem, neither SPIN norMAGIC performwell when verifying data-driven properties of
protocols, whereas Pistachio’s rules are designed to include datamodeling. Feamster andBalakrishnan [4] deﬁne
a high-level model of the BGP routing protocol by abstracting its conﬁguration. They use this model to build rcc,
a static analysis tool that detects faults in the router conﬁguration. Naumovich et al. [5] propose the FLAVERS
tools, which uses dataﬂow analysis techniques to verify Ada pseudocode for communication protocols. Alur
and Wang [22] formulate the problem of verifying a protocol implementation with respect to its standardized
documentation as reﬁnement checking. Implementation and speciﬁcation models are manually extracted from
the code and the RFC document and are compared against each other using reachability analysis. The method
has been successfully applied to two popular network protocols, PPP and DHCP. In the context of crypto-
graphic protocols, Bhargavan [23] propose fs2pv, a prototype tool to extract a veriﬁable formal model from
implementation code of protocols written in F#. The formalmodel is then veriﬁed against realistic threatmodels
using the ProVerif [24] automatic veriﬁcation tool, which we describe in the next paragraph. It is unclear whether
fs2pv can verify non-cryptographic properties of protocols, or can be adapted to C, which many protocols are
implemented in.
Many systems have been developed for verifying properties of abstract protocol speciﬁcations. In these sys-
tems the speciﬁcation is written in a specialized language that usually hides some implementation details. These
methods can perform powerful reasoning about protocols, and indeed one of the assumptions behind Pistachio
is that the protocols we are checking code against are already well-understood, perhaps using such techniques.
The main difﬁculty of checking abstract protocols is translating RFCs and other standards documents into the
formalisms and in picking the right level of abstraction.Murϕ is a system for checking protocols inwhich abstract
rules can be extracted from actual C code [25]. Similarly to Pistachio, the user has to specify a list of variables
and functions relevant to the properties to be checked as well as deﬁne the correctness properties of the protocol
model. The main differences between our approach and theMurϕ system lie in how the rules are interpreted: in
Murϕ the rules are an abstraction of the system and are derived automatically, whereas in Pistachio rules specify
the actual properties to be checked in the code. Uppaal [3] models systems (including network protocols) as
timed automata, in which transitions between states are guarded by temporal conditions. This type of automata
is very useful in checking security protocols that use time challenges and has been used extensively in the liter-
ature to that extent [26,27]. In [27], Uppaal is used to model check the TLS handshake protocol. CTL model
checking can also be used to check network protocols. In [28], an extension of CTL is used to model AODV.
Butler [29,30] rely on theMSR formalization language [31,32] to provide precise speciﬁcations for the Kerberos
authentication protocol. The speciﬁcations are in the form of a ﬁnite set of transitions that deﬁne all possible
executions from a ﬁxed initial state. The properties of the protocol are expressed as formal theorems and veriﬁed
using theorem proving techniques. The NRL Protocol Analyzer [33] models cryptographic protocols [34] as a
set of communicating state machines, each of which with multiple local state variables. To determine if a state is
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insecure, the analyzer works backwards from the state until all the possible transitions have been either explored
or discarded. In ProVerif [24], cryptographic protocols are abstracted by a set of Prolog clauses that correspond
to the execution of the protocol itself and to the computational abilities and knowledge of an attacker. A novel
resolution-based algorithm similar to the Prolog solving algorithm is then used to prove secrecy properties.
Similarly to Pistachio, the correct behavior of the protocol is represented through a set of rules. However, in
ProVerif, the rules fully model the protocol and are sufﬁcient to determine whether the protocol is faulty. On
the other hand, Pistachio works directly with the implementation, and its rules specify only partial correctness
properties to be checked using symbolic execution and theorem proving.
Recently there has been signiﬁcant research effort on developing static analysis tools for ﬁnding bugs in
software. We list a few examples: SLAM [35] and BLAST [36] are model checking systems that have been used
to ﬁnd errors in device drivers. MOPS [37] uses model checking to check for security property violations, such
as TOCTTOU bugs and improper usage of setuid. Metal [38] uses data ﬂow analysis and has been used to ﬁnd
many errors in operating system code. ESP [39] uses data ﬂow analysis and symbolic execution, and has been
used to check sequences of I/O operations in gcc. CQual [40–42] uses type qualiﬁer inference to ﬁnd a variety of
bugs in C programs, including security vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel.
All of these tools have been effective in practice, and allow the user to specify the property to be checked.
However, they are restricted to checking ﬁnite state properties, i.e., safety properties that can be modeled by
associating ﬁnite automata with program locations (local variables and the heap); the automaton takes tran-
sitions when certain actions happen in the program, and the tool issues a warning if an automaton enters an
error state. Some examples of ﬁnite state properties are: forbidding double acquires and releases of the same
lock (a bug if locks are non-reentrant) [41,35]; forbidding double frees of the same memory location [38]; and
making sure ﬁles are open in the right mode before being read or written [39]. It is unclear whether these tools
can effectively check the kinds of rich, data-dependent rules used by Pistachio.
Dynamic analysis can also be used to trace program executions, although we have not seen this technique
used to check correctness of implementations. Gopalakrishna et al. [43] deﬁne an Inlined Automaton Model
(IAM) that is ﬂow- and context-sensitive and can be derived from source code using static analysis. The model
is then used for online monitoring for intrusion detection.
Another approach to ﬁnding bugs in network protocols is online testing. Protocol fuzzers [44] are popular
tools that look for vulnerabilities by feeding unexpected and possibly invalid data to a protocol stack. Because
fuzzers can ﬁnd hard-to-anticipate bugs, they can detect vulnerabilities that a Pistachio user might not think to
write a rule for.On theotherhand, the inherent randomnessof fuzzersmakes themhard topredict, and sometimes
ﬁnding even a single bug with fuzzing may take a long time. Pistachio quickly checks for many different bugs
based on a speciﬁcation, and its determinism makes it easier to integrate in the software development process.
Our speciﬁcation rules are similar to precondition/postcondition semantics usually found in software spec-
iﬁcation systems or design-by-contract systems like JML [45]. Similar constructs in other veriﬁcation systems
also include BLAST’s event speciﬁcations [36].
6. Conclusion
We have deﬁned a rule-based method for the speciﬁcation of network protocols which closely mimics pro-
tocol descriptions in RFC or similar documents. We have then shown how static analysis techniques can be
employed in checking protocol implementations against the rule-based speciﬁcation and provided details about
our experimental prototype, Pistachio. Our experimental results show that Pistachio is very fast and is able to
detect a number of security-related errors in implementations of the SSH2andRCPprotocols, whilemaintaining
low rates of false positives and negatives.
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Fig. A.1. Pistachio rule-based speciﬁcation grammar.
Appendix A. Rule grammar
Fig. A.1 gives the grammar for rules R in Pistachio. This grammar is slightly generalized from the ac-
tual implementation for clarity. Rules are written in S-expression notation to make them easier for Pista-
chio to parse. Each rule R is named with an identiﬁer id and contains a hypothesis and conclusion. Each
hypothesis or conclusion contains exactly one pattern, which may either be the empty pattern, match a re-
turn statement, or match a function call. The expressions used within a pattern, described by non-terminal
Base, are restricted to identiﬁers or the wildcard pattern _. Hypotheses and conclusions also contain a set
of facts, which are assertions about simple expressions with no side effects. Expressions can refer to iden-
tiﬁers, and may access array elements of ﬁelds. Within expressions Expr we allow basic operations such as
addition and subtraction. We also allow len, which returns the length of an array (or produces an error if
Pistachio does not know the length of the array). Conclusions may also set ghost variables, which we write
with an S-expression beginning with SET rather than the inﬁx := notation used in the main text of the
paper.
Appendix B. Choosing a theorem prover
While we chose Darwin as Pistachio’s automatic theorem prover, we also experimented with using Vampyre
[46] and HOL [47]. Vampyre is a sound theorem prover based on the Nelson-Oppen architecture. Although it
was written to produce explicit proofs of veriﬁcation conditions for proof carrying code applications, it can
also be used as a general purpose theorem prover. As the name indicates, HOL is a higher order logic1 theorem
prover. Since Darwin and Vampyre are written in OCaml, as is Pistachio, it is easy to call them directly to
represent theorems and obtain proofs. And since HOL uses ML (of which OCaml is a variant) to represent
its theorems, proofs, and even proof strategies, and we were easily able to transform the theorems needed by
Pistachio into the format required by HOL.
We compared all three theorem provers by running Pistachio on the benchmarks described in Section 4.
Across all runs, we counted the total number of theorems Pistachio asked that were true, and the number of
those true theorems each prover was able to prove. (Counting these was a non-trivial task, but was not as hard
1 A version of predicate calculus with types and variables ranging over functions and predicates.
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Fig. B.1. Theorems proved by Darwin, Vampyre and HOL.
as it seems—we assumed that any theorem provable by one of the theorem provers was true, and thus only had
to manually check the remaining theorems, which were plentiful but tended to be small.)
Fig. B.1 gives a Venn diagram of the results. Overall, the three provers had very similar accuracy, and there
were some true theorems that none of the provers were able to show. We can see that the large majority of
theorems succeeded for all three provers (52,475 out of a total of 66,343 theorems). Note that this is only a
rough indication of utility, since we did not evaluate how the differences affected false positive and negative
rates. Despite the very similar accuracy, Darwin had the best running time—an average of 0.0024 s per theorem,
compared to 0.113 s for Vampyre and 0.679 s for HOL. This, along with the ease of use of its OCaml interface
compared to Vampyre and HOL, are the reasons we chose Darwin as the theorem prover for Pistachio.
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